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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the influence of changes in elements of both informal and formal institutions at the 
national level in 37 countries on changes in corporate governance practices in those countries over a period 
of four years. We also examine these relationships for emerging countries versus developed countries. For 
the sample as a whole, we find that changes in rule of law are related to changes in corporate governance 
practices. For emerging countries, changes in corporate governance practices are related to changes in the 
rule of law as well as the interaction of changes in control of corruption with changes in government 
effectiveness. This differs from the pathway to improved corporate governance practices for developed 
nations which is not affected by any single factor, but rather the interaction of changes in rule of law and 
changes in regulatory quality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The globalization of capital flows has presented opportunities and challenges to firms in emerging 
countries as they strive to gain legitimacy and attract foreign investment. Improving the institutional 
environment in which these firms operate is an important precursor for their success.  However, changing 
the informal and formal elements of the institutional environment in a country is no easy task. For instance, 
there is a challenging pathway for an emerging nation to accede to EU membership. Substantive change, 
including but not limited to adoption of codes and rules, is required. This effort includes constructively 
adjusting complex labyrinths of both societal norms and laws. Historical and cultural tendencies must also 
be recognized and respectfully blended with progress (Daniel, Cieslewicz, & Pourjalali, 2012; Cieslewicz, 
2016). This study strives to further illuminate the relationship between the institutional environment at the 
national level and corporate governance practices in emerging as well as developed economies. This study 
may help, for instance, in understanding the merit of the directions provided by policy makers to emerging 
nations. 
Emerging countries face significant challenges when improving standards and elements of their 
institutional environments. Passing laws and regulations as part of the formal institutional structure may be 
much easier than effecting change in the informal institutional structure, which plays a key role in talent 
development and business norms which are key underpinnings in implementation of the formal 
institutional change.  For example, adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Lungu, 
Caraiani, & Dascălu, 2017) and International Standards on Auditing (Duhovnik, 2011) provides emerging 
countries with explicit guidance to accountants consistent with those of developed nations.  However, 
without the education and training infrastructure, as well as the norms imposed by a history of 
professionalism in the financial services industry, implementing new regulations focusing on transparency 
and fairness in corporate disclosures and dealings may devolve into form over substance. Further, an 
emerging country is likely to struggle to have its own needs and concerns heard by the relevant standard 
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setting organizations dominated by developed economies. The formal decision to adopt new standards is 
itself difficult considering the full ramifications to practice the decision implies, yet substantial support is 
also required from the surrounding institutional environment for the new formal standards to be 
implemented successfully (Daniel, Cieslewicz, & Pourjalali, 2012; Cieslewicz, 2014). Real, substantive 
adoption supported by underlying institutional change leads to enhanced trust and increases in foreign 
direct investment (Lungu et al., 2017). This study discusses why institutional change, both formal and 
informal, is needed to reinforce wanted changes in corporate governance practices.  
The institutional environment is made up of different elements that may or may not significantly 
influence corporate governance practices. Knowing which aspects of institutional environments have the 
greatest influence on corporate governance practices is instructive for implementing change. We find that 
changes in rule of law are associated with changes in corporate governance practices in countries with 
emerging economies. Rule of law refers to the rules of society, particularly the quality and enforcement of 
contracts and property rights, as well as the trustworthiness of the judicial system in enforcing laws. 
When control of corruption is combined with changes in government effectiveness, significant changes in 
corporate governance practices are also realized in emerging economies. This differs from the pathway to 
improved corporate governance practices for developed nations. We find that for developed nations, a 
combination of changes in rule of law and changes in regulatory quality is needed. 
Consistent with the perspectives of North (1990), Aoki (2001) and Amable (2003) that institutions 
are “the rules of the game” (North 1990) in a society, we operationalize the institutional environment using 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010), which 
reflect the degree to which national institutions are effective, both in design and enforcement. Likewise, 
our measure of corporate governance focuses not on codes but on actual practices, using a composite 
measure that incorporates such matters as board accountability, financial disclosure and internal controls, 
shareholder rights, executive compensation, takeover defenses and ownership base, and corporate 
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accountability. This nation-level composite measure of individual corporate practices is from Governance 
Metrics International (GMI). 
The institutional environment permits, constrains, and reinforces corporate governance practices 
within a nation. The world provides illustrations of this. South Korea, in reaction to the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, transformed its institutional environment. Doing so provided support for changes in 
corporate governance practices. For instance, barriers limiting the ownership of foreign shareholders were 
lifted, leading foreign ownership to increase from 13% of public firms in 1997 to 42% in 2006 (Aguilera, 
Castro, Lee, & You, 2012; Moon, 2006). This also led to increased direction from the worldwide financial 
community.  
The global financial crisis of 2008 exerted pressure on the institutional environments of many 
nations to enhance regulation over banking and executive compensation. These institutional changes have 
supported changes in corporate governance practices which otherwise, though previously recognized as 
best practices, would not be widely implemented. Our sample of 37 nations from 2006 to 2010 includes 16 
emerging and 21 developed nations, and covers this period of significant challenge and change. 
Another example in which changes in the institutional environment have led to changes in 
corporate governance practices involves the US. Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it was 
understood that auditors that profit more from consulting services they provide for their audit clients than 
from audit fees have a conflict of interest. It was understood that an audit committee could increase the 
distance between management and auditors and provide auditors with a pathway to resolve significant 
audit concerns. It was also understood that management should take responsibility for the internal controls 
of their organization, and that COSO provided a framework for such governance (COSO, 1992). However, 
it was not until the institutional environment changed and provided legislative and regulatory 
reinforcement that these recommended practices became wide-spread corporate governance practices. The 
subsequent transition was not instantaneous, and was punctuated by adjustments and results that lagged the 
directives to change.  
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Europe provides another more recent example of the need to make changes to institutional 
environments to realize changes in practices. Worldwide, there has been resistance to female participation 
on boards. To gain access to female talent, diversity quotas were implemented in Europe, which facilitated 
changes in corporate governance (Daniel & Li, 2018). Female representation on boards now ranges 
between 25-45% in Europe, while without such mandatory quotas in the UK and the US, the percentage of 
women on corporate boards hovers around 20, and the percentages for Asian nations, such as Japan, 
Singapore, India and China, are lower still.  
We posit that emerging economies have more to gain from improving their institutional 
environments than developed nations do, and that by enhancing their institutional environments, they can 
support improvements in corporate governance practices. Increases in foreign direct investment are more 
likely if such nations bolster their institutional environments and consequently reap real improvements in 
their corporate governance practices. This contrasts with only superficially adopting corporate governance 
codes, but not making changes in underlying institutions to reinforce the wanted changes in corporate 
governance practices. For example, in the 1990’s, Vietnam was in the process of opening their economy, 
but from the perspective of their institutional environment, wavered back and forth between supporting 
real change and clinging to their past. Multinationals’ investment in the nation paralleled these waves, 
flowing and ebbing with the improvements and erosions in the institutional environment. Since that time, 
Vietnam has made substantial institutional improvements, making changes to corporate governance 
practices possible.  
Change comes at a cost, and change is not simple, as demonstrated by Romania’s efforts to 
transition to IFRS (Ionaşcu, Ionaşcu, Olimid, & Calu, 2007). Romania could not immediately transition, 
because companies in Romania did not have the capacity to do so. Companies and their employees 
require time to change. It is only after substantial consultants’ fees, training costs, and related costs are 
incurred that change occurs. Consequently, regulators must insist on the change, and incentives have to 
exist, or change is not fully embraced. Change requires great effort, and so it is important that the right 
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changes are identified and focused on. The intent of this research is to help identify the most important 
elements of the institutional environment on which to focus to realize the wanted changes in corporate 
governance practices.  
The next section of the paper provides a review of the prior literature on institutions and corporate 
governance and presents our hypotheses. In the third section, we operationalize the constructs and 
variables used to test our hypotheses. In the fourth section, we provide the details of the statistical 
analyses and present our results. The fifth section provides a discussion of the results and our conclusions, 
while the last section describes limitations of this work and suggestions for future research.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Changes in the Institutional Environment Enable Changes in Corporate Governance Practices 
Institutional environments provide the broad structure that corporations must work within. 
Corporations are selective in choosing which institutional environments to invest in. Such selectivity is 
warranted, as research has demonstrated. For instance, Gande, Schensler, and Senbet (2009) found that 
US firms diversifying into foreign markets achieve higher valuation benefits when diversifying into 
countries with creditor rights that are stronger than that of the US. Institutional environments also have 
bearing on corporate governance practices.  
To improve corporate governance, there has been an international trend towards formal adoption 
of corporate governance best practices. The OECD (2008) reports that its Principles of Corporate 
Governance “has become the global benchmark, accepted in OECD and non-OECD countries alike.” For 
example, recently adopted ASEAN (2013) Corporate Governance Scorecard Principles closely follow the 
OECD Principles. Similarly, Japan’s recently adopted corporate governance code is also modeled after 
the OECD Principles. This general movement towards convergence may in part be explained by the 
perceived need by countries to gain legitimacy in the global business environment (Reed, 2002). 
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However, if most nations have converged to this benchmark and the variation in adopted corporate 
governance codes has dwindled, why do the quality of actual corporate governance practices as measured 
by such organizations as ISS, Glass Lewis, and MSCI demonstrate wide variation in the quality of 
corporate governance?  
We posit that sustainable, real improvements in corporate governance require reinforcement from 
improvements in institutional environments. Corporate governance codes represent ideals more than rules 
when institutional environments do not reinforce them. In a sense, corporate governance may be viewed 
as a game inside of a larger game as corporate governance functions within institutional environments. 
Corporate governance is subject to institutional environments, which provide the “rules of the game in a 
society . . . the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). 
Improvements to institutional environments, to be meaningful to companies that operate within them, 
must include changes to both formal and informal (Chacar, Celo & Hesterly, 2018) components. For 
instance, it does not help to have a new rule, but then to have some way out of compliance. There are 
some rules in the EU, for instance, for which noncompliance can be explained away (Shrives and 
Brennan, 2017). Changes to institutional environments must be substantive, involving both formal and 
informal change, in order to effectively influence corporate governance practices. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) described the institutional environment as having coercive, 
imitative, and normative components. Adopting best corporate governance practices from other nations is 
an example of an imitative component of institutional environments. Imitation, however, can be in 
substance or in form, and may require additional coercive and normative influence to be realized in 
substance. Influences from professional organizations are a type of normative influence. Yet, professional 
organizations often lack adequate enforcement power to require compliance with codes. For instance, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) can remove members from their professional 
organization for violations of their code of conduct. However, if state boards of accountancy, the SEC, 
and the PCAOB did not also clamp down on the privilege to practice as a CPA through suspending 
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licensing and issuing sanctions, the disciplinary actions of the AICPA would have limited influence on 
the ethics of the profession. Coercive factors include regulation and enforcement. Coercive influences 
have the capacity to not just ask for or suggest, but demand improvements in corporate governance 
practices.  
In examining the institutional environment, we rely on six elements of country governance as 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010): rule of law, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, control of corruption, and government effectiveness. 
Rule of Law. Rule of law influences the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, particularly the quality and enforcement of contracts and property rights, as well as 
the trustworthiness of the judicial system in enforcing laws. Nations have been converging with respect to 
corporate governance codes (OECD 2008), but the quality of corporate governance practices should 
depend on the extent to which these codes are required to be followed. If rule-following overall in an 
institutional environment is improved, the extent to which corporate governance codes are complied with 
should also improve.  
Regulatory Quality. Regulatory quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Corporate 
governance is likely to perform best in a setting where trade and labor policies and tax structures promote 
the private sector development and business has access to capital markets. We expect a positive 
relationship between the change of regulatory quality and the change of corporate governance practices. 
Voice and Accountability. Voice and accountability reflects expectations of being able to 
participate in government and represents the extent of free media, which we expect should influence 
accountability and shareholder rights. If individuals responsible for corporate governance know that 
improper acts will be publicly exposed in the media, they may be more motivated to follow rules and 
implement better corporate governance practices.  
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Political Stability and Absence of Violence. Political stability and absence of violence are 
fundamental elements of the institutional environment. Without political stability, it is difficult to pass 
new laws and to implement an effective infrastructure to administer those laws. In addition, political 
instability will deter foreign investors who often help drive improvements in corporate governance, 
particularly in emerging nations.  
Control of Corruption. Research on corruption (Boubakri et al., 2013) has indicated corruption is 
associated with poorer corporate governance. Corruption manifests itself in the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests. Control of corruption restricts instances in which public power is 
abused for private gain, and is foundational to the expectation that corporate governance is aligned with 
all stakeholders.  
Government Effectiveness. Government effectiveness is reflected in the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures. Government 
effectiveness also includes the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. Effective bureaucratic infrastructure and qualified personnel 
should facilitate administration of regulations and advance predictability, which should promote better 
corporate governance. Improvements in government effectiveness should be positively related to 
improvements in corporate governance practices.  
Overall, when institutional environments function well and improve, then improvements in 
corporate governance practices should be realizable. Conversely, if institutional environments deteriorate, 
we would expect a deterioration of corporate governance practices when compared to best practice 
standards. It is instructive to discover which parts of the institutional environment must change to 
improve corporate governance practices. 
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Hypothesis 1: Changes in institutional environments are positively related to changes in 
corporate governance practices within a given nation. The changes in institutional environments 
include changes to the following elements: 
  1a: Rule of Law 
  1b: Regulatory Quality 
  1c: Voice and Accountability 
  1d: Political Stability 
  1e: Control of Corruption 
  1f: Government Effectiveness 
 
Changing Corporate Governance Practices in Emerging Nations 
The hypothesis described above constitutes a baseline evaluation of relationships between 
changes in institutional environments and changes in corporate governance practices. However, our 
primary purpose is to understand the extent to which these relationships vary between developed and 
emerging economies.  
A premise of this study is that adoption of corporate governance codes must be supported by 
improvements to the institutional environment to realize the desired improvements in corporate 
governance practices. Two nations can formally adopt the same corporate governance codes, but 
thereafter the two countries can have substantially different actual corporate governance practices. This is 
particularly the case if one nation is developed and has robust institutions, while the other nation has an 
emerging economy and weaker institutions. Without reinforcement, good intentions often fade. This is 
similar to what happens when a new internal control is implemented in an organization. If it requires 
change and possibly more work, and if proper implementation is not monitored, employees may be quick 
to ignore it.  
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As noted earlier, the movement towards convergence in corporate governance practices may in 
part be explained by the need by countries to gain legitimacy in the global business environment (Reed, 
2002). With regard to this, it is the emerging economies that have the most to gain from improving their 
institutional environments. In comparison to the institutional environments of developed economies, they 
also have the most room for improvement. Consequently, they are more likely to affect changes in their 
institutional environments, with one desired effect being that corporate governance practices will 
improve.  
China provides a case study to examine this in. In the early stages of its economic transformation, 
China created special economic regions within which different rules and enforcement were applied. In 
essence, China piloted its reform of its institutional environment within these special economic regions. 
Achieving tremendous success in these regions, they have expanded their efforts. This of course did not 
happen in a vacuum. Other variables were in play, including foreign interests in cheap labor and 
incentives for those in power. All other variables aside, it has been necessary for China to change their 
institutional environment to allow corporate governance to function more effectively and efficiently. Yet, 
in China regional differences in the strength of institutions persists, and this effects corporate governance 
practices. For instance, Li and Qian (2013) found that in areas in China where minority shareholders’ 
interests are better protected, the resistance of controlling shareholders to takeovers weakens.   
If institutional environments in emerging countries can be improved, investment can be attracted 
and firms can raise capital. As regulations related to such important matters as protecting minority 
shareholders and controlling corruption improve, and corporate governance practices improve, businesses 
and the national economy should benefit. Conversely, if institutional environments within emerging 
economies falter and deteriorate, advances in corporate governance practices are likely to rapidly erode, 
leading to withdrawal of foreign investment.  
We expect that the influence of changes in institutional environments on changes in corporate 
governance practices will be most pronounced in emerging countries. We will evaluate each of the six 
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elements of the institutional environment to ascertain which elements are most important to affect 
changes in corporate governance practices in emerging economies. Our second hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The elements of the institutional environment that will need to change to realize 
changes in corporate governance practices will differ for emerging nations and developed nations. 
This will be evident in evaluating the impact on corporate governance of following elements of 
the institutional environment in emerging and in developed economies: 
  2a: Rule of Law 
  2b: Regulatory Quality 
  2c: Voice and Accountability 
  2d: Political Stability 
  2e: Control of Corruption 
  2f: Government Effectiveness 
 
Interactions between Elements of the Institutional Environment 
While each element of the institutional environment may have a unique direct influence on 
corporate governance practices, we also believe that institutional elements may act in combination and 
have synergistic effects when improved in tandem. For example, improvements in rule of law may not 
have much of an effect unless they are accompanied by corresponding improvements in regulatory quality 
to develop policies and regulations on a timely basis to administer the law. There could also be a 
synergistic interaction between improvements in the control of corruption and a more vibrant free press, 
as the latter could expose corruption. Improving control of corruption while simultaneously improving 
government effectiveness could also improve corporate governance practices by moving from inefficient 
government interference which exacerbates corruption, to an efficient and supporting governmental 
support system. 
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We therefore propose that positive interaction effects between the elements of the institutional 
environment, particularly those directly related to legal institutions and government policies, systems, 
procedures and enforcement, will result in corresponding changes in corporate governance practices, 
whereas changes in single institutional factors may not. Following on with the reasoning in Hypothesis 2, 
we propose that these interactions may operate differently for emerging versus developed nations. We 
propose that the synergistic effects may be more pronounced in emerging nations which may be lacking 
in not only formal institutions but also informal institutions.  
 
 Hypothesis 3: Positive changes in the elements of the institutional environment interact with 
each other to enhance changes in corporate governance practices.  
  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Model 
The model below was used to empirically test the hypothesized relationships between changes in 
institutional environment variables and changes in corporate governance practices. 
GOVDIFF  =  α0 + α1 Ri,t + η1Dcountry + η2 Dyear + εi,t 
Where  
GOVDIFF = change in corporate governance scores of 37 countries from 2006 through 2010, obtained 
from Governance Metrics International (GMI) 
Ri,t =an array of institutional variables which is composed of the following 
VADIFF: difference between the value of voice and accountability in time t+1 and that of voice 
and accountability in time t 
PSNVDIFF: difference between the value of political stability and absence of violence in time t+1 
and that of political stability and absence of violence in time t 
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GEDIFF: difference between the value of government effectiveness in time t+1 and that of 
government effectiveness in time t.  
RQDIFF: difference between the value of regulatory quality in time t+1 and that of regulatory 
quality in time t  
RLDIFF: difference between the value of rule of law in time t+1 and that of rule of law in time t  
CCDIFF: difference between the value of control of corruption in time t+1 and that of control of 
corruption in time t  
Dcountry = an array of country dummy variables which is used to consider the country effect on 
corporate governance practices across countries 
Dyear = an array of year dummy variables which is used to consider the time effect on corporate 
governance practices across countries 
 
All datasets are at the national level, all the analysis was done at the national level, and the results 
apply at the national level. Each variable was measured annually for five years, 2006 through 2010, 
representing four years of change for each variable. With 37 countries this results in a sample size of 148 
for most analyses. Our model has strengths when compared to the models of previous studies. For 
instance, Doidge, Karolyi and Stultz (2007) used institutional variables that do not change across years. 
Consequently, they could not employ country fixed effects because there is perfect collinearity between 
institutional variables and country dummies. Though Doidge et al. (2007) include country dummies, they 
could not control for institutional variables (e.g., rule of law *antiselfdealing index) and country dummies 
in the same regression, due to perfect collinearity. They ran a regression of corporate governance scores 
on either rule of law*antiselfdealing index or country dummies. 
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Dependent Variable 
Corporate Governance Practices. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) have proposed guidelines 
emphasizing transparency in corporate governance to protect minority shareholders and encourage 
sufficient disclosure. In addition, private firms that provide information to institutional investors, such as 
ISS, Glass Lewis, and MSCI, have indirectly encouraged reforms in corporate governance practices 
through their proxy advisory services and ratings of individual corporate practices. These organizations 
have focused attention on actual corporate practices regarding board independence, compensation 
policies, and financial transparency. They generally look beyond legal requirements imposed on public 
companies and move the discussion of corporate governance from that of general best practices and 
country codes of good governance to specific corporate behaviors and practices.  
The variation in practices makes it difficult to develop a construct for corporate governance 
practices at the country level; however, prior to their acquisition by MSCI in 2014, Governance Metrics 
International (GMI Ratings) published a country corporate governance index extrapolated from the 
corporate governance practices of the firms within each country that they followed and rated for their 
investor clientele. It is these country-level ratings that we have drawn upon for the dependent variable in 
this study. GMI calculated corporate governance ratings for individual companies “By developing a 
highly-detailed governance profile incorporating hundreds of variables per company plus analyst 
insights. In addition to reviewing board composition, board leadership, company documents and websites 
to identify stated policies and procedures, GMI also reviews regulatory actions, legal proceedings and 
other sources to gauge whether company behavior is consistent with its stated policies. Once database 
profiles are complete, GMI applies a scoring algorithm to generate company ratings on a scale of 1.0 to 
10.0 (10.0 being the highest). The use of asymmetric geometric scoring is meant to magnify the impact of 
outliers. This includes both those with the very best practices – who are then rewarded more – or those 
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with the worst – who are penalized. GMI scores are relative in that each company is scored against other 
companies in the GMI research universe” (GMI 2006a).  
The composite country scores reflect the corporate governance practices of the universe of firms 
rated by GMI within each country as compared to the overall global universe of rated firms. The GMI 
composite country ratings were publicly available on the GMI website for years 2006 to 2010. We 
calculated changes in the rating by subtracting two consecutive values.  
 
Independent Variables  
Institutional Environment. One of the most well-known and comprehensive studies of the 
institutional environment of countries is that of Kaufmann et al. (2010), who have provided measures of 
national institutional environments affecting governance through their work on the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI project reported aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for 212 countries and territories annually beginning in 1996 for six dimensions of 
national governance. The WGI aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, 
citizen, and expert survey respondents in nations with emerging and developed economies. The individual 
data sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations (See Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
The WGI variables are compiled from a variety of credible sources, and are rigorously reviewed by the 
developers for consistency across countries and over time. We use this dataset because of its reflection of 
the coercive component of institutional environments discussed earlier as well as its expected relationship 
with corporate governance practices. All six measures made available by the WGI—regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, and political 
stability—are predicted to have positive correlations with corporate governance practices. For our 
independent variables, we use the change from year t to year t+1 for the following variables (as described 
directly from the WGI website): 
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RL= Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
RQ= Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
 
VA = Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
 
PSNV= Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism. 
 
CC= Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
 
GE= Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.  
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Control Variables  
Country Dummies. Doidge et al. (2007) show that governance ratings are explained much more 
by country characteristics (ranging from 39% to 73%) than firm characteristics (ranging from 4% to 
22%). In particular, they find almost 39% of the variance in Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 
corporate governance ratings, 73% of the variance in the S&P transparency and disclosure ratings, and 
72% of the FTSE ISS Corporate Governance Index are explained by country-level dummy variables. 
Building on Doidge et al. (2007), we include country dummies into the OLS analysis. By including 
country dummies, we control for the average differences across countries in any unobservable predictors, 
thus reducing an omitted variable bias.  
Time dummies. We also include year dummies. By including year dummies, we control for the 
average difference across years. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results of the empirical analysis are shown in Table 1 through Table 5B. Table 1 reports 
summary statistics for the change in the GMI corporate governance practices indices by country. Among 
37 countries, the number of countries with a negative mean of corporate governance change is 22 and the 
number of countries with a positive mean is 15. Among the 22 countries with a negative mean, there are 
12 emerging countries and 10 developed countries. Among the 15 countries with a positive mean there 
are 4 emerging countries and 11 developed countries. Due to the presence of both positive and negative 
changes in governance practices in both groups, a test of means was performed resulting in no significant 
difference in the mean change in GMI corporate governance practices between the emerging market and 
developed market countries.  
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                                                             -------------------- 
                                                             TABLE 1 HERE 
                                                             -------------------- 
 
Table 1A reports summary statistics for the six independent variables, representing annual changes in 
institutional factors, shown separately for the 16 emerging market nations and the 21 developed market 
nations. A test of means for significant differences between the emerging market and developed market 
samples for each of the institutional variables reveals only one significant difference – between 
government effectiveness at the 5% level.  
 
-------------------- 
TABLE 1A HERE 
---------------------- 
 
Table 2 reports a correlation analysis. The changes in regulatory quality and rule of law are 
positively correlated with the changes in corporate governance at the 5% significance level and at the 
10% significance level, respectively. We anticipated each of the institutional environment variables to 
have a positive correlation with corporate governance practices. The change in rule of law (RLDIFF) and 
the change in regulatory quality (RQDIFF) meet this expectation. Contrary to our expectations, one 
variable, change in voice and accountability (VADIFF), is negatively correlated with the change in 
corporate governance practices variable at the 10% significance level. The results of this univariate 
analysis should, however, be cautiously interpreted since we cannot control for relevant variables in the 
correlation, thereby leading to significant correlation between variables. 
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-------------------- 
TABLE 2 HERE 
-------------------- 
 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 – The Influence of Institutional Environment Changes on Changes in Corporate 
Governance Practices 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression of the change in corporate governance practices on 
the changes in institutional environment variables. In Model 1, we regress the change in corporate 
governance practices on the changes in the six institutional variables without country and year dummies.  
We find that the change in voice and accountability and the change in control of corruption, are 
negatively associated with the change in corporate governance practices at the 10% and 5% significance 
levels, respectively, which is contrary to our expectations. In Model 1, the change in regulatory quality 
and the change in rule of law are positively associated with the change in corporate governance practices 
at the 5% significance level, respectively, which is consistent with our expectations. However, in Model 1 
we do not control for country and year, so the results should be interpreted with caution. 
In Model 2, we regress the change in corporate governance practices on the change in the six 
institutional variables, controlling for country effects using country dummies. We find a positive 
relationship at the 5% significance level between the change in rule of law and the change in corporate 
governance practices and a positive relationship at the 10% significance level between the change in 
regulatory quality and the change in corporate governance practices. 
In Model 3, we regress the change in corporate governance practices on the change in the six 
institutional variables, controlling for year effects using year dummies, and find that the change in 
regulatory quality and the change in rule of law continue to have positive effects at the 5% significance 
level.  
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To control for both country and year effects, in Model 4, we regress the change in corporate 
governance practices on the change in all institutional variables with both country and year dummies. We 
find that only the change in rule of law is positively related to the change in corporate governance 
practices at the 10% significance level. The economic or practical significance of these results can be 
explained as follows: the increase of one standard deviation in the change of rule of law is related to an 
increase of 0.18 standard deviation in the change of corporate governance practicesi. To test for 
multicollinearity, we compute variance inflation factors (VIF) for all variables in each specification. All 
VIF factors are within acceptable ranges, the largest VIF of 1.98 being on RQDIFF, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in our analysis. While it might be common to see high levels of 
multicollinearity between these institutional variables, because we are analyzing annual changes in the 
variables, multicollinearity is not present in the data. 
Based on the results in Model 4 of Table 3, which includes both year and country fixed effects, 
we find some support for Hypothesis 1, in that the improved rule of law will have a positive effect on 
corporate governance practices. This is where efforts should be focused when seeking to strengthen 
institutional environments so as to support improvements in corporate governance practices. 
 
-------------------- 
TABLE 3 HERE 
-------------------- 
 
Tests of Hypothesis 2 – Differences in Developed and Emerging Nations 
To test Hypothesis 2, we divide the countries into two groups, emerging nations and developed 
nations, using the criteria of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Emerging Markets Database, to determine if there 
is a difference in the effect of the changes in institutional variables on the changes in corporate 
governance practices in emerging nations in comparison with developed nations. These results are shown 
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in Tables 4A and 4B.  
Results for Emerging Nations. Table 4A presents the results of the regression of the changes in 
corporate governance practices on the changes in institutional environment variables in emerging nations. 
In Model 1, we regress the changes in corporate governance practices on the changes in six institutional 
variables without country and year dummies and find that the change in political stability and absence of 
violence (PSNVDIFF) is negatively associated with the change in corporate governance practices at the 
10% significance level, which is contrary to our expectations. In Model 1, the coefficient of the change in 
regulatory quality is positive at the 10% significance level; the change in rule of law is positively 
associated with the change in corporate governance practices at the 5% significance level, consistent with 
our expectations. However, in Model 1, we do not include country and year dummies, so the results 
should again be interpreted with caution. 
In Model 2, we control for country effects and regress the changes in corporate governance 
practices on the changes in six institutional environment variables with country dummies. We find that 
the change in regulatory quality and the change in rule of law are both positively related to the change in 
corporate governance practices at the 10% significance level. Of note in Model 2, which includes country 
fixed effects, is that the adjusted R squared increases significantly relative to Model 1. This is consistent 
with the finding of Doidge et al. (2007) who report that country characteristics account for much more of 
the variance in governance ratings than firm characteristics. 
In Model 3, we regress the changes in corporate governance practices on the changes in the six 
institutional environment variables, controlling for year but not country effects and find that there is a 
positive association between the change in rule of law and the change in corporate governance practice at 
the 1% significance level.  
 
Controlling for both country and year effects, we regress the changes in corporate governance 
practices on the changes in all institutional variables with country and year dummies in Model 4. We find 
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that the change in rule of law remains positively related to the change in corporate governance practices at 
the 5% level. Again, the inclusion of the country fixed effects significantly increases the adjusted R 
squared of Model 4 relative to Model 3 for emerging countries. 
 
-------------------- 
TABLE 4A HERE 
-------------------- 
 
Results for Developed Nations. Table 4B presents the results of the regression of the changes in 
corporate governance practices on the changes in institutional environment variables in developed 
nations. In Model 1, we regress the changes in corporate governance practices on the changes in six 
institutional variables without country and year dummies and find that the change in voice and 
accountability and the change in control of corruption are negatively associated with the change in 
corporate governance practices at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively, which is not consistent 
with our expectations. However, in Model 1, as we do not control for country and year effects, the results 
should be interpreted with caution.  
In Model 2, we regress the changes in corporate governance practices on the changes in six 
institutional environment variables controlling for country. We find that there is still a marginally 
statistically significant and negative association between the change in voice and accountability and the 
change in corporate governance practices. Of note in Model 2, which includes country fixed effects, is 
that adjusted R squared turns negative, which means that controlling for country does not efficiently 
explain the change in corporate governance practices for developed nations. This contrasts with the 
finding of Doidge et al. (2007), which reports that country characteristics are important determinants of 
corporate governance practices. Breaking our analysis down between developed and emerging economies 
provides additional insight in this respect. 
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In Model 3, we regress the changes in corporate governance practices on the changes in six 
institutional environment variables controlling for year and find that the coefficient of control of 
corruption remains negative at the 10% significance level, contrary to our expectations. However, the 
adjusted R squared increases significantly relative to that in Model 1 with the addition of the fixed time 
effects variable. 
Regressing the changes in corporate governance practices on the changes in all institutional 
variables while controlling for country and year in Model 4, we find that none of the institutional 
environment variables are significant. Similar to the findings in model 2, we find that the addition of the 
country effects dummy variable lowers the adjusted R squared, indicating that adding country effects in 
the developed market sample does not efficiently increase the explanatory power of the model. However, 
the results indicate that when we control for both country and year effects, the direct effect of changes in 
individual institutional environment variables on changes in governance practices are not significant in 
the developed nations. We also note that the presence of positive and negative coefficients in this model 
leads us to consider whether there are significant interactions between the variables, which will be tested 
in the next section.  
In summary, Hypothesis 2, that changes in institutional environments have greater influence on 
changes in corporate governance practices in nations with emerging economies rather than developed 
economies, cannot be entirely rejected. Changes in rule of law in emerging nations are significantly 
associated with changes in corporate governance practices. Since emerging countries may have relatively 
weaker institutional environments and relatively poorer corporate governance practices, changing rule of 
law is enough to lead to significant changes in corporate governance practices.  
 
-------------------- 
TABLE 4B HERE 
-------------------- 
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Tests of Hypothesis 3 – Interaction Effects 
Hypothesis 3 posits that there will be a synergistic effect from positive changes in the institutional 
elements on corporate governance practices. We tested all six possible combinations of two-way 
interactions for the four institutional factors most closely related to (and under the control of) government 
systems – GEDIFF, CCDIFF, RQDIFF, and RLDIFF. We also tested interactions for VADIFF with 
CCDIFF, since we theorize that a more effective free press may enhance control of corruption. We also 
tested interactions for PSNVDIFF with CCDIFF because we theorize that there could be an interactive 
relationship between the political stability of a country and control of corruption. All interactions were 
tested for the entire sample of countries and also separately for emerging and developed nations. In each 
interaction test, we include the direct and interaction terms of the pairs of variables. We also included the 
direct effect of rule of law, in light of the significance of that variable in the models developed in Tables 3 
and 4A. None of the interaction pairs tested showed significance for the sample as a whole. However, 
when we separate the nations into two samples by level of development, we found one significant 
interaction effect for emerging nations (Table 5A), and another for developed nations (Table 5B).  
In the emerging countries, in addition to a significant direct effect for change in the rule of law, 
we found a significant effect for the interaction term for government effectiveness with control of 
corruption. This implies that, in emerging nations, when improvements in government effectiveness are 
combined with improvements in control of corruption, there is a very synergistic and positive effect on 
corporate governance practices. The large coefficient for the interaction term and the high adjusted R 
squared for this model indicate that emerging market nations that focus on simultaneously improving 
these two institutional elements together, as well as improving the rule of law, may achieve significant 
improvements in corporate governance practices. 
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-------------------- 
TABLE 5A HERE 
-------------------- 
 
In contrast, in the developed nations, a significant interaction effect was found for change in rule 
of law with change in regulatory quality. Table 5B provides the results of the direct effects of rule of law 
and change in regulatory quality, along with the interaction term for change in rule of law with change in 
regulatory quality, on change in corporate governance practices. For the developed nations, the interaction 
term is significant in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3. However, in Model 4, the significance of the 
interaction term disappears when we control for both country and year. In addition, similar to the results 
in Table 4B, including country dummies significantly decreases the adjusted R squared in developed 
nations and thus, in examining interaction effects in the developed market sample, the result in Model 3 
provides a more efficient explanatory model of changes in corporate governance practices than Model 4.  
 
-------------------- 
TABLE 5B HERE 
-------------------- 
 
Overall, we find some support for Hypothesis 3 in both emerging and developed nations. The 
interactions that are significant are different. Taken as a whole, our results present a more complicated 
picture. In emerging nations, which arguably have less sophisticated legal and regulatory enforcement 
mechanisms, improving the rule of law, as well as a combination of improved control of corruption with 
improved government effectiveness, results in a relatively powerful explanatory model for improvements 
in corporate governance practices.  
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However, in the developed nations, it is only through strengthening (deteriorating) both rule of 
law and regulatory quality together that improvements (deteriorations) in corporate governance practices 
are realized, and the direct effects of improving any single institutional variable are not significant. We 
conjecture that since developed nations already have relatively effective institutional environments and 
relatively better corporate governance practices, changes in institutional environments require greater 
efforts in multiple elements to lead to significant changes in corporate governance practices. 
To summarize the results of the hypotheses tests, we find support for Hypothesis 1 in the sample 
as a whole, and the emerging market sample. Models for emerging and developed nations differ, 
supporting Hypothesis 2. Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 3 in both market samples, and 
particularly in the emerging nations, as evidenced by the significant coefficient for the interaction term 
and the high explanatory power of the model even when controlling separately for year and country.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore relationships between changes in components of the 
institutional environment and changes in corporate governance practices across countries, and to examine 
whether improvements in the institutional environment may have different effects on corporate 
governance practices in emerging economies than in developed nations. Our findings contribute to our 
understanding of these relationships in that changes in institutional environments are related to changes in 
corporate governance practices overall, and in particular, changes in regulatory quality and rule of law are 
associated with changes in corporate governance practices.  
When we differentiate between emerging and developed countries, we learn much more. The 
effect of change in rule of law on corporate governance practices was robust in a sample of emerging 
nations. Emerging nations stand to lose much by allowing rule of law to deteriorate since incoming 
investment is likely to be deterred and existing investment is likely to exit. For policy makers in emerging 
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nations, this finding suggests that corporate governance practices may be influenced through 
strengthening the rule of law. Our results also indicate that in emerging nations, while change in rule of 
law has the most significant single direct effect on corporate governance practices, when we examine 
interaction effects, we also see significant impacts on corporate governance practices when improvements 
in government effectiveness are accompanied by improvements in the control of corruption. 
In the sample of developed nations, while the direct impacts of any one institutional environment 
factor were not significant, change in rule of law interacts with change in regulatory quality to achieve 
changes in corporate governance practices. This suggests that developed nations must improve (degrade) 
both of these elements of their institutional environments in combination in order to realize improvements 
(deteriorations) in their corporate governance practices. Also of importance in terms of allocating 
resources to affect changes in corporate governance practices, the findings of this study suggest that 
changing four other elements of the institutional environment – political stability and the absence of 
violence, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption – separately may 
not have as strong of an effect on changing corporate governance practices in either emerging or 
developed nations.  
For policy makers, our findings suggest that when seeking to improve corporate governance 
practices it is important to also focus on improving the institutional environment – by strengthening the 
rule of law, and by simultaneously enhancing regulatory quality, in developed nations. In emerging 
nations, strengthening the rule of law and simultaneously improving government effectiveness with 
control of corruption is most beneficial.  
Our results also speak to the importance of one of the premises of our study. While international 
adoption of best codes of corporate governance is widespread (OECD, 2008), there is still variation in the 
quality of corporate governance practices across nations. It is not sufficient to simply adopt a corporate 
governance code of best practice; it is also necessary to adjust the institutional environment to support 
improvements in corporate governance practices. Formally adopting best corporate governance practices 
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without reinforcing them with sound institutional changes may result in only superficial changes that does 
not accomplish the intended objective.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Just as different nations may have financial systems that are fundamentally different, such as 
bank-based or stock market-based systems, nations have corporate governance arrangements that are 
different from each other. These have arisen from different political, cultural and historical contexts 
(Daniel et al., 2012). With increasing international interaction and competition between firms, these 
corporate governance approaches have gradually come to look more like each other, or converge (Witt 
2004). Yet, across nations, there continues to exist fundamentally different perspectives (Witt & Redding, 
2009) on the ideal structure of economies and the institutional environments that support corporate 
governance. We do not focus on differences in forms of corporate governance, but rather on differences in 
actual institutional and corporate governance outcomes.  
Like many cross-national studies, a limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size. 
While the World Bank database used for the institutional environment contained over 200 countries and 
territories (Kaufmann et al. 2010), the Governance Metrics International (GMI 2006b) corporate 
governance practices country scores were available for only 37 of these countries. For country-level 
studies, this is a reasonably large group of countries. 
Firm-level corporate governance ratings have received some criticism. Although the link between 
corporate governance ratings and reported corporate profits or stock returns has been questioned, the 
effectiveness of the ratings in reflecting board independence, oversight, and other measures of corporate 
governance practices has not been criticized. GMI reported governance ratings for publicly traded 
companies only; accordingly, our results may not be applicable to all firms, but should be applicable to 
those of interest to large international investors. Another limitation of our study is that we regress 
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measures of corporate governance practices aggregated to the nation level. That is, we employ a country-
level regression rather than a firm-level regression. The country-level regression may be subject to 
omitted correlated variables (Defond, Hung, & Trezevant, 2007). Therefore, additional analysis at the 
firm level may enable a clearer understanding of how various institutional factors impact firms of 
different sizes, industries or other micro-economic characteristics. However, firm-level data also has 
some limitations. One limitation is that unlisted firms are typically excluded because the data is 
unavailable. Additionally, regressions at the firm level which utilize nation-level measures of institutions 
may suffer from cutting across levels of analyses, or including nation-level variables in a regression that 
is performed on firm-level data. In light of these challenges, as commonly coded financial data using 
XBRL becomes available, and assuming additional data on corporate governance practices becomes 
available, we encourage further research in this area employing firm level data from multiple countries. 
Our results apply primarily to nations and policy makers within nations as our analyses are performed at 
the country level, although the results do have implications for firms and their corporate governance 
practices.    
Another limitation has less to do with the data and more to do with the recommended use of the 
results. The study identifies elements of the institutional environment that are critical for the functioning 
of corporate governance practices. Our intent is to assist policymakers with decisions about the 
allocations of their limited resources. We do not, however, intend to convey that those elements of the 
institutional environment that have an insignificant statistical relationship with corporate governance 
practices are any less important for other reasons. We acknowledge a nation could become economically 
powerful through improving some elements of the institutional environment while ignoring other 
elements, such as voice and accountability, and do not encourage this approach.  
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Table 1 Annual changes in country-level GMI corporate governance practices scores from 2006-2010 
and Emerging and Developed S&P Designations 
  Mean Std dev Min Max 
Emerging 
Market* 
Developed 
Market* 
Australia -0.15 0.41 -0.67 0.26  Yes 
Austria 0.21 0.43 -0.35 0.67  Yes 
Belgium -0.09 0.33 -0.30 0.40  Yes 
Brazil 0.17 0.47 -0.17 0.85 Yes  
Canada 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.07  Yes 
Chile -0.46 0.47 -0.95 0.17 Yes  
China 0.11 0.32 -0.17 0.40 Yes  
Denmark 0.04 0.41 -0.50 0.37  Yes 
Finland 0.10 0.25 -0.18 0.40  Yes 
France 0.06 0.17 -0.19 0.17  Yes 
Germany 0.04 0.37 -0.42 0.49  Yes 
Greece 0.43 0.67 -0.29 1.28 Yes  
Hong Kong -0.26 0.21 -0.43 0.04  Yes 
India -0.03 0.31 -0.30 0.41 Yes  
Indonesia -0.17 0.66 -0.63 0.80 Yes  
Ireland 0.02 0.23 -0.23 0.26  Yes 
Israel -0.02 0.29 -0.36 0.35 Yes  
Italy -0.10 0.47 -0.63 0.31  Yes 
Japan -0.18 0.51 -0.92 0.25  Yes 
South Korea 0.41 0.92 -0.35 1.74 Yes  
Malaysia -0.13 0.29 -0.50 0.16 Yes  
Mexico -0.67 0.48 -1.16 -0.05 Yes  
Netherlands -0.02 0.24 -0.28 0.19  Yes 
New Zealand 0.01 0.25 -0.29 0.28  Yes 
Norway -0.17 0.43 -0.69 0.27  Yes 
Poland -0.27 0.29 -0.62 -0.02 Yes  
Portugal -0.06 0.27 -0.31 0.28 Yes  
Russia -0.25 0.38 -0.52 0.29 Yes  
Singapore -0.21 0.39 -0.74 0.12  Yes 
South Africa -0.04 0.24 -0.40 0.14 Yes  
Spain -0.24 0.38 -0.73 0.20  Yes 
Sweden 0.11 0.36 -0.41 0.42  Yes 
Switzerland 0.06 0.37 -0.25 0.60  Yes 
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Taiwan -0.17 0.35 -0.61 0.18 Yes  
Turkey -0.38 0.29 -0.79 -0.11 Yes  
United Kingdom  0.08 0.15 -0.12  0.24  Yes 
United States -0.02 0.04 -0.07  0.03  Yes 
*Emerging and Developed Market designations taken from Standard and Poor’s. 
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Table 1A Descriptive statistics for institutional environment (independent) variables 
Descriptive statistics for emerging nations   
  Obs Mean Std dev Min Max 
VADIFF 64  0.00  0.05  -0.09  0.14  
PSNVDIFF 64 -0.01  0.17 -0.44  0.47  
GEDIFF 64  0.01  0.09  -0.21  0.17  
RQDIFF 64  0.00  0.09  -0.23  0.28 
RLDIFF 64  0.01  0.09  -0.23  0.21  
CCDIFF 64 -0.02  0.11  -0.23 0.23 
      
Descriptive statistics for developed nations   
  Obs Mean Std dev Min Max 
VADIFF 84  0.00  0.04  -0.13  0.11  
PSNVDIFF 84 -0.02  0.10  -0.25  0.24  
GEDIFF 84 -0.01  0.10  -0.27  0.23  
RQDIFF 84  0.01  0.08  -0.20  0.17  
RLDIFF 84  0.01  0.05  -0.16  0.13  
CCDIFF 84 -0.02  0.09  -0.30  0.21  
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Table 2 Pearson correlation analysis 
  GOVDIFF VADIFF PSNVDIFF GEDIFF RQDIFF RLDIFF CCDIFF 
GOVDIFF 1             
VADIFF -0.15* 1      
PSNVDIFF -0.06 0.11 1     
GEDIFF 0.02 0.05 0.15* 1    
RQDIFF 0.17** -0.02 0.26*** 0.39*** 1   
RLDIFF 0.15* 0.16* 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 1  
CCDIFF -0.10 0.13 0.16* 0.21 0.33*** 0.37*** 1 
GOVDIFF denotes the annual change of the corporate governance scores measured by Governance 
Metrics International (GMI). VADIFF denotes the annual difference between the value of voice and 
accountability in time t+1 and that of voice and accountability in time t. PSNVDIFF denotes the 
difference between the value of political stability and absence of violence in time t+1 and that of political 
stability and absence of violence in time t. GEDIFF denotes the difference between the value of 
government effectiveness in time t+1 and that of government effectiveness in time t. RQDIFF denotes the 
difference between the value of regulatory quality in time t+1 and that of regulatory quality in time t. 
RLDIFF denotes the difference between the value of rule of law in time t+1 and that of rule of law in time 
t. CCDIFF denotes the difference between the value of control of corruption in time t+1 and that of 
control of corruption in time t. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01, respectively. 
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Table 3 Regression of the change in country-level corporate governance practices scores on changes in 
institutional variables for a five-year period (four measures of annual changes per country between 2006-
2010 for corporate governance practices and for the institutional environment variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VADIFF -1.23* -0.99 -0.62 -0.03 
 (-1.88) (-1.26) (-0.90) (-0.04) 
PSNVDIFF -0.35 -0.26 -0.18 0.00 
 (-1.52) (-0.93) (-0.69) (0.02) 
GEDIFF -0.22 -0.09 -0.37 -0.26 
 (-0.73) (-0.25) (-1.37) (-0.86) 
RQDIFF 0.96** 0.93* 0.77** 0.68 
 (2.53) (1.92) (2.36) (1.46) 
RLDIFF 1.30** 1.31** 1.14** 1.10* 
 (2.17) (2.00) (2.16) (1.94) 
CCDIFF -0.85** -0.72 -0.64 -0.34 
 (-2.06) (-1.37) (-1.55) (-0.65) 
CONSTANT -0.09*** -0.13 0.10 0.06 
 (-2.80) (-0.75) (1.12) (0.35) 
Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES 
Sample Size 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R squared 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.23 
In summary, change in rule of law has a significant effect on changes in corporate governance practices. 
For a discussion of the different models, see the text. VADIFF denotes the difference between the value 
of voice and accountability in time t+1 and that of voice and accountability in time t. PSNVDIFF denotes 
the difference between the value of political stability and absence of violence in time t+1 and that of 
political stability and absence of violence in time t. GEDIFF denotes the difference between the value of 
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government effectiveness in time t+1 and that of government effectiveness in time t. RQDIFF denotes the 
difference between the value of regulatory quality in time t+1 and that of regulatory quality in time t. 
RLDIFF denotes the difference between the value of rule of law in time t+1 and that of rule of law in time 
t. CCDIFF denotes the difference between the value of control of corruption in time t+1 and that of 
control of corruption in time t. t-statistics obtained from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
brackets. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01, respectively. 
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Table 4A For emerging nations, the regression of the change in country-level corporate governance 
practices scores on changes in institutional environment variables for a five-year period (four measures of 
annual changes per country between 2006-2010 for corporate governance practices and for the 
institutional environment variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VADIFF -1.04 -0.40 -0.94 -0.29 
 (-0.87) (-0.29) (-0.76) (-0.20) 
PSNVDIFF -0.58* -0.38 -0.59 -0.32 
 (-1.96) (-1.01) (-1.50) (-0.74) 
GEDIFF -0.23 -0.02 -0.65 -0.39 
 (-0.34) (-0.03) (-0.87) (-0.58) 
RQDIFF 1.32* 1.41* 1.07 1.09 
 (1.80) (1.70) (1.60) (1.44) 
RLDIFF 1.78** 1.58* 2.21*** 1.97** 
 (2.17) (1.77) (2.62) (2.29) 
CCDIFF -1.06 -0.88 -0.94 -0.68 
 (-1.34) (-0.92) (-1.10) (-0.64) 
CONSTANT -0.14** -0.01 0.08 0.18 
 (-2.45) (-0.02) (0.41) (0.55) 
Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES 
Sample Size 64 64 64 64 
Adjusted R squared 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.19 
Despite a smaller sample size, the effect of the change in rule of law (RLDIFF) on change in corporate 
governance practices is greater when emerging nations are focused on. For a discussion of the different 
models, see the discussion in the text. For an explanation of the variables, see Table 3. t-statistics obtained 
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from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01, 
respectively. 
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Table 4B For developed nations, the regression of the change in country-level corporate governance 
practices scores on changes in institutional variables for a five-year period (four measures of annual 
changes per country between 2006-2010 for corporate governance practices and for the institutional 
environment variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VADIFF -1.68* -1.71* -0.21 0.26 
 (-1.93) (-1.75) (-0.28) (0.26) 
PSNVDIFF 0.03 -0.03 0.38 0.32 
 (0.09) (-0.06) (1.19) (0.97) 
GEDIFF -0.11 -0.13 -0.32 -0.36 
 (-0.34) (-0.31) (-1.14) (-0.99) 
RQDIFF 0.60 0.57 0.64 0.61 
 (1.39) (0.85) (1.47) (0.84) 
RLDIFF 0.27 0.49 -0.15 -0.05 
 (0.34) (0.54) (-0.25) (-0.08) 
CCDIFF -0.81** -0.74 -0.50* -0.17 
 (-2.24) (-1.42) (-1.73) (-0.39) 
CONSTANT -0.05 -0.11 0.17*** 0.09 
 (-1.19) (-0.62) (2.77) (0.52) 
Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES 
Sample Size 84 84 84 84 
Adjusted R squared 0.05 -0.11 0.29 0.23 
There is no effect of the change in rule of law (RLDIFF) on change in corporate governance practices for 
developed economies. For a discussion of the different models, see the discussion in the text. For an 
explanation of the variables, see Table 3. t-statistics obtained from heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are in brackets. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01, respectively. 
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Table 5A Interaction term for emerging nations 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GEDIFF 0.67 1.24* 0.20 0.68 
 (1.13) (1.75) (0.29) (1.03) 
CCDIFF -1.66** -0.97 -1.44* -0.75 
 (-2.27) (-1.20) (-1.87) (-0.85) 
RLDIFF 1.62** 1.49 1.93*** 2.15*** 
 (2.27) (1.52) (2.84) (2.71) 
GEDIFF*CCDIFF 12.39 21.87* 14.45* 28.35** 
 (1.47) (1.88) (1.67) (2.44) 
GEDIFF*RLDIFF 7.07 1.89 8.95 5.82 
 (0.71) (0.15) (1.03) (0.52) 
RLDIFF*CCIFF 9.88 -1.93 6.01 -10.26 
 (1.23) (-0.26) (0.81) (-1.57) 
CONSTANT -0.25*** -0.095 0.01 0.18 
 (-3.72) (-0.22) (0.03) (0.52) 
Country fixed effects NO YES NO  YES  
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES  
Sample Size 64 64 64 64 
Adjusted R squared 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.31 
This analysis likewise focuses on the interaction between the two institutional environment variables 
found to have a significant effect on changes in corporate governance practices in emerging nations. The 
interaction (GEDIFF*CCDIFF) between change in government effectiveness and change in control of 
corruption has a significant effect when considering emerging economies. t-statistics obtained from 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01, 
respectively. 
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Table 5B Interaction term for developed nations 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
RQDIFF 0.45 0.37 0.46 0.41 
 (1.01) (0.59) (1.22) (0.67) 
RLDIFF 0.30 0.50 -0.20 -0.06 
 (0.43) (0.58) (-0.35) (-0.09) 
RQDIFF*RLDIFF 16.06** 13.65* 11.31** 7.71 
 (2.42) (1.88) (1.97) (1.31) 
CONSTANT -0.06 -0.14 0.17 0.07 
 (-1.60) (-0.73) (3.09) (0.46) 
Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES 
Sample Size 84 84 84 84 
Adjusted R squared 0.03 -0.11 0.31 0.26 
This analysis also focuses on the interaction between the two institutional environment variables found to 
have a significant effect on changes in corporate governance practices, in developed nations. There is 
some evidence of an interaction (RQDIFF*RLDIFF) effect between change in rule of law (RLDIFF) and 
change in regulatory quality (RQDIFF) for developed nations. See the text for additional discussion. t-
statistics obtained from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, 
p<0.05, p<0.01, respectively. 
 
  
Endnote 
i The coefficient of RLDIFF is 1.10 in Model 3 in table 3. The standard deviation of the change of rule of law is 
0.067 and the standard deviation of the change of corporate governance practices is 0.399.  1.1*(0.067/0.399) = 
0.18. 
                                                          
